Пост
Цей пост за його id.
https://api.web3aggregator.io/api/v1/posts/17431 curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $W3A_API_KEY" 'https://api.web3aggregator.io/api/v1/posts/17431'Потрібен ключ: W3A_API_KEY в оточенні.
API віддає одне це повідомлення: інші частини альбому там — окремі пости, пов'язані полем album.
Документація APIX 100 hacked for $4.75M
Rootcause : Anyone could instantly join the Senate by freezing X tokens (and paying a small candidacy fee, reported as ~100 X). Membership was based on the current frozen stake. There was no snapshot of balances/voting power and no timelock (or other delay) on proposals.
A proposal could be created, voted on (with the newly acquired majority), and executed in the same transaction, including calls that invoked the treasury’s own swap functions (e.g.,
This allowed the attacker to:
1. Flash-borrow USDT (via Aave), buy X tokens, and distribute/freeze them across controlled contracts to seize 2 of the 3 Senate seats.
2. Immediately propose + vote + execute a malicious proposal that forced the Freezer to swap a large amount of treasury X tokens into a freshly created, attacker-controlled (and empty/manipulated) PancakeSwap V3 X-USDT pool with min-output set near zero.
3. Withdraw the liquidity from that pool, sell the recovered X on legitimate markets, repay the flash loan, and keep the profit (~$4.75–4.85M USDT range reported across related alerts).
@EthSecurity1
Rootcause : Anyone could instantly join the Senate by freezing X tokens (and paying a small candidacy fee, reported as ~100 X). Membership was based on the current frozen stake. There was no snapshot of balances/voting power and no timelock (or other delay) on proposals.
A proposal could be created, voted on (with the newly acquired majority), and executed in the same transaction, including calls that invoked the treasury’s own swap functions (e.g.,
v3Swap).This allowed the attacker to:
1. Flash-borrow USDT (via Aave), buy X tokens, and distribute/freeze them across controlled contracts to seize 2 of the 3 Senate seats.
2. Immediately propose + vote + execute a malicious proposal that forced the Freezer to swap a large amount of treasury X tokens into a freshly created, attacker-controlled (and empty/manipulated) PancakeSwap V3 X-USDT pool with min-output set near zero.
3. Withdraw the liquidity from that pool, sell the recovered X on legitimate markets, repay the flash loan, and keep the profit (~$4.75–4.85M USDT range reported across related alerts).
@EthSecurity1